Reportedly, an item of discussion Tuesday between Lebanese officials and Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, was the presidential election. Assuming Zarif has a say in the matter, which he doesn’t, that the topic should have been broached with him at all is worrisome. It is unfortunate that Lebanon’s Christian leaders appear not to sense the very real dangers in the ongoing presidential vacuum. Partly that’s because they refuse to understand that it might be used to undermine the credibility of the post-Taif constitution, in that way leading to its overhaul and, beyond that, a reduction in Christian representation in parliament and government.
What is most disappointing is that a large number of Christians in general and Maronites in particular, continue to feel hostility toward Taif, insisting it deprived them of the political prerogatives they enjoyed under the previous constitution. What they cannot grasp, even 26 years later, is that the agreement preserved equal representation for a Christian community that is numerically entitled to far less. Any new amendment to the Constitution is bound to reflect this demographic reality, so that Taif may one day be regretted.
Yet Christian politicians, as usual caught up in their marginal disputes and rivalries, have not seriously addressed how the presidential vacuum might play out. The Maronite patriarch, always on hand to talk about topics about which he knows nothing, has been strangely silent on the possibility that the constitution may be altered to the Christians’ disadvantage.
Perhaps that’s because the Christians cannot see what mechanism might bring about a change in the post-Taif constitution. Yet it is increasingly apparent that if Hezbollah and Iran lose in Syria, which appears almost inevitable as Bashar Assad cedes ground and as his military continues to suffer heavy losses, they will need to consolidate Hezbollah’s position in Lebanon to protect the party against a Sunni backlash that would push for its disarmament.
The only way this could happen is for Hezbollah to anchor itself more firmly in the Lebanese political system – not to integrate into it, however, but to use it as a barrier to better protect the party’s autonomy. This it can only do by rewriting the constitution and expanding the sectarian weight of the Shiite community, to ensure it can retain a hold on state institutions and block any initiatives that threaten its vital interests.
Such an effort would be tricky. It requires, first, taking representation away from the Christians, who, under Taif, are entitled to half the seats in parliament and government. Second, it means persuading the Sunni community, regarded as the main beneficiary of the Taif accord, to accept such a process, the aim of which would be to expand Shiite representation.
The scenario that is most often heard is that Hezbollah seeks a division of shares by thirds – in other words a third of representation for Shiites, a third for Sunnis, and a third for the Maronites, with the shares of sectarian minorities in each religious community distributed within this broader framework.
Assuming that is Hezbollah’s intention, how might the party overcome the doubts of Christians and Sunnis? In the case of the Christians the most promising avenue is fear. If there is a Sunni takeover in Syria, particularly one led by Islamists, Hezbollah will exploit this to persuade anxious Christians that their only hope is a Christian-Shiite alliance ensuring a permanent two-thirds majority over Sunnis in the Lebanese state.
Would this be enough to persuade Christians to give up their half share in state bodies? Probably not. But as a keen observer of sectarian relations, the parliamentarian Bassem Shabb, has suggested, there could be a vital sweetener added to make such a deal palatable: Shiite acceptance of a decentralized, even a federal, political system. Many Christians today approve of such a project, and taking power away from Christians in the state only to compensate them with greater self-government could be a way.
What of the Sunnis? While the Sunnis might lose little from a transformation of Taif, since they would surrender little real political power, they could be inclined to reject a plan that seeks to transform them into a permanent minority in government and parliament. Their uneasiness would represent the major barrier to an amendment of the constitution, particularly at a moment when Sunnis feel empowered thanks to Sunni gains in Syria.
The difficulties do not necessarily mean that Hezbollah would abandon such a plan. The party really has no choice, fearing that the momentum in Syria will extend to Lebanon. Time and again Hezbollah has undermined the subtle aspects of the Lebanese power-sharing game, accepting its principles only when they served its purposes, but doing them egregious harm when the party felt this was necessary. Striving for a new constitutional arrangement to serve the party’s political ends would constitute such egregious harm because it would shatter the consensus around Taif that has propped up the political system since 1990, almost certainly without leading to agreement over a new system.
A key factor here will be the Christians’ reaction. Responding too hurriedly to events in Syria would be catastrophic. Christians must continue to rely on a national consensus to protect themselves, not presume that institutionalizing a minority status for Sunnis is the solution. Indeed, it may be the worst option of all, as Sunnis may well successfully block efforts to change Taif, but will also conclude that their partners in the state are no longer committed to communal coexistence and compromise.
This could push them to fall back on communal solidarity with their brethren in Syria, undermining Lebanon’s power-sharing arrangement. The Lebanese, always keen to complain about the demerits of their system, should also see its benefits. Lebanon is the sole Arab country with a highly mixed population that has avoided war in the past four years. There is a reason for this, and getting rid of that reason will only put the country in peril.